The Athena Class of Risk-Limiting Ballot Polling Audits by Zagórski, Filip et al.
The ATHENA Class of Risk-Limiting Ballot Polling Audits
Filip Zago´rski
filip.zagorski@gmail.com
Grant McClearn Sarah Morin Neal McBurnett
Poorvi L. Vora
poorvi@gwu.edu
August 7, 2020
Abstract
Existing ballot polling election tabulation audits are designed for stopping decisions that are made ballot-by-
ballot; we refer to these as B2 audits. Real ballot polling audits are not B2, but round-by-round (R2): many ballots
are drawn in a single round before a stopping decision is made. We show that B2 BRAVO—the main risk-limiting
stopping rule in use today—results in significant inefficiency when directly applied to real R2 audits. We present the
ATHENA class of risk-limiting R2 stopping rules. We prove that each rule is at least as efficient as the corresponding
B2 BRAVO stopping rule applied at the end of the round. We have open-source software libraries implementing most
of our results in both python and MATLAB.
As an illustrative example, we show that the first round size for a 90% stopping probability for ATHENA is about
half that for B2 BRAVO (stopping rule applied at the end of the round) for all state margins in the 2016 US Presidential
election. Further, when compared to the B2 BRAVO stopping rule applied on ballots in selection order, the first round
sizes for the ATHENA class of audits are 15 − 29% smaller, with the best percentage improvements for larger round
sizes. This implies that keeping track of the order when drawing ballots R2 is not beneficial, because ATHENA is more
efficient even without information on selection order. These results are significant because current approaches to real
ballot polling election audits use the B2 BRAVO rules, requiring about twice as much work on the part of election
officials. Many states performing risk-limiting audits for the first time plan to use ballot polling audits in November
2020 for the US Presidential election and could substantially benefit from improvements.
All our contributions are for audits with zero error of the second kind. Our approach relies on analytical expres-
sions we derive for stopping probabilities. The results of these analytical expressions are verified by comparison with
the percentiles Lindeman et al. previously obtained using BRAVO simulations [2].
We believe our results may be applied in a straightforward fashion to other SPRTs with β = 0 if the stopping
condition is monotonic increasing with the number of winner ballots (Bayesian audits are an example) but proofs in
this paper apply only to BRAVO.
1 Introduction
The most popular examples of election tabulation ballot polling audits include BRAVO [2] and Bayesian audits [6];
these audits may be viewed as special cases/extensions of the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT), see [9, 4].
When the decisions of whether to stop the audit or draw more ballots are taken after each ballot draw, and the stopping
condition is satisfied exactly when the audit is stopped, these audits—as SPRTs—are most efficient audits. The term
most efficient refers here, as elsewhere, to an audit requiring the smallest expected number of ballots given either
hypothesis: a correct election outcome or an incorrect one, if the election is drawn from the assumed prior. The
expectation is taken over the randomness of the ballot draws, and, in the case of Bayesian audits, also the randomness
of the true tally (Bayesian audits treat the true tally as an unknown random variable).
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In real election audits, multiple ballots are drawn in a round before a decision is taken. This paper shows that BRAVO is
not a most efficient test in this case, and proposes the ATHENA class of more efficient risk-limiting tests, demonstrating
significant decreases in first-round sizes. This could be of consequence for election audits of the 2020 US Presidential
election.
1.1 Problem
We refer to audits where decisions are taken after each ballot draw as ballot-by-ballot or B2 audits. The general audit,
however, is a round-by-round or R2 audit where, in the jth round, some ballots are drawn, after which a decision is
taken regarding whether to (a) stop the audit and declare the election outcome correct, (b) stop the audit and go to a
manual recount, or (c) draw the (j + 1)th round. A B2 audit is a special case of the R2 audit, when a single ballot is
drawn in each round.
There are two ways to apply B2 audit rules to an R2 audit. Consider a total of nj ballots drawn after the jth round, of
which kj are for the reported winner.
• End-of-round: In this application, the B2 stopping rule for kj winner ballots in a sample of nj ballots determines
whether the audit will stop.
• Selection-ordered-ballots: In this application, ballot order is recorded and the B2 stopping condition is tested
∀n ≤ nj . The audit stops if the B2 condition is satisfied for any value of n ≤ nj .
Selection-ordered-ballots is generally more efficient than end-of-round as a means of applying B2 rules to R2 audits,
but requires the significant additional effort of preserving enough information to be able to recreate the subtotals of
winner ballots in selection order. End-of-round relies only on the tallies and does not require selection order. As our
paper shows, neither is a most efficient R2 stopping rule.
One may view the problem we address as lying somewhere between (a) the problem solved by Neyman-Pearson [7]:
derive a single-use binary hypothesis testing rule satisfying certain error criteria, and (b) the problem solved by Wald
[10]: derive a stopping condition for sequential sampling, satisfying certain error criteria, where the condition is tested
draw-by-draw. We address the problem of sequential sampling in rounds, where the condition is tested after multiple
draws.
1.2 Our Contributions
Our contributions are as follows:
1. We derive analytical expressions for the risk and probability of stopping, given the history of rounds and the
margin for the BRAVO audit. Treating the B2 BRAVO audit as an R2 audit with nj = j, we verify that the
expressions we derive predict the stopping percentiles originally obtained by Lindeman et al. using BRAVO
simulations [2, Table 1]. The average of the absolute value of the fractional difference between our results and
those of [2] is 0.13%. The largest difference has value 190 ballots, corresponding to a fractional difference of
0.41 %, in the estimate of the expected number of ballots drawn for a margin of 1%. This difference could
be due to small inaccuracies in our computational approach (such as rounding off errors or the finiteness of
summations involved in the computations) or the finiteness of the number of simulations used to generate the
ATHENA Ballot Polling Audits 3
results of [2]. Our approach is easily extended to audits with stopping conditions that are monotone increasing
in the number of ballots for the announced winner, such as Bayesian audits. The code for computing these
expressions is available as a MATLAB library, released as open-source under the MIT License [8].
2. We present the ATHENA class of R2 stopping rules for audits MINERVA and ATHENA and prove that each is
risk-limiting and at least as efficient as the corresponding end-of-round BRAVO stopping rule. Another audit
from the ATHENA class, METIS, is out of scope for this draft.
3. We provide experimental results and software to support the use of the proposed audits:
• To illustrate the efficiency improvements, we compute (without simulations, using the derived analytical
expressions), for each state in the 2016 US Presidential election, risk limit α = 0.1 and a stopping proba-
bility of 0.9, first round sizes for end-of-round BRAVO and ATHENA. We find that ATHENA requires about
half the number of ballots, across all margins.
• We compute first round sizes for selection-ordered-ballots BRAVO and find that ATHENA requires about
15−29% fewer ballots for the data of the 2016 US Presidential election, with the improvement being better
for smaller margins. Thus ATHENA is more efficient than selection-ordered-ballots BRAVO and does not
require the additional book-keeping of recording selection ballot order.
• Our code for the audits is available as MATLAB and Python libraries [11, 8, 3]. All code is released as
open source under the MIT license.
This contribution is important because a number of states have undertaken ballot polling pilots in the last year
and plan to use ballot polling audits in November 2020. We hope that our results and code can help developers
of auditing software. We also note that, in many scenarios, ballot comparison or batch comparison audits could
be more feasible. One may also consider combinations of ballot comparison and ballot polling audits, such as
described in [5].
4. The ATHENA class of R2 stopping rules is a class of B2 rules when round size is one. Of theoretical interest,
we prove that B2 MINERVA (round size one) has the same stopping rule as B2 BRAVO, as does B2 ATHENA for
some values of its parameters.
We do not claim that the audits of the ATHENA class are the most efficient R2 audits with zero error of the second kind
(β = 0). The problem of finding the most efficient R2 audits is open.
Unlike the SPRT and other Martingale-based approaches, the stopping rules for audits of the ATHENA class use
information about the history of round sizes. For this reason the stopping condition for rounds other than the first one
does not depend only on the cumulative sample size and number of winner ballots drawn, but also on the history of
individual round sizes.
We do not address some simple extensions of our work in this paper. For example, we do not consider audits with a
limit on the total number of ballots drawn in the polling audit (if the audit fails to stop, a full sequential hand count
would follow). Were we to do so, we could provide audits with larger stopping probabilities given the same risk limit.
This paper focuses exclusively on BRAVO. However, we expect that our results extend to other risk-limiting SPRTs
with β = 0 and a stopping condition that is monotonic in the number of winner ballots drawn; examples include
Bayesian audits.
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1.3 Organization
Section 2 presents the model and related work. Section 3 motivates the problem with an example demonstrating that
the application of B2 rules to an R2 audit results in inefficiencies. Section 4 introduces the ATHENA class of audits
with examples and provides insight into why the audits are risk-limiting and more efficient than either R2 application
of B2 BRAVO. Section 5 describes the analytical approaches for computing probabilities for multiple-round audits.
Section 6 presents the MINERVA and ATHENA audits, and Section 7 presents rigorous claims of their risk-limiting
and efficiency properties in the form of Theorems and Lemmas. Section 8 presents experimental results. Section 9
concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a plurality contest with 2 candidates, and assume ballots are drawn with replacement. We denote by w the
true winner, wa the announced winner, `a the announced loser and p the announced fractional tally for wa (typically
based on preliminary, uncertified results). We assume all ballots have a vote for either the winner or the loser; because
ballots are sampled with replacement, our argument is easily extended to contests with multiple candidates and invalid
ballots (as for BRAVO, for example, see [1]).
A polling audit will estimate whether wa is the true winner. We denote by nj the total number of ballots drawn at the
end of the jth round, and by kj the corresponding total number of ballots for the winner. Hence the number of new
ballots drawn in round j is nj − nj−1, and the number of new votes for the winner drawn in round j is kj − kj−1. If
necessary, one may assume that n0, k0 = 0. We often refer to [n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .] as the round schedule. A B2 audit
is an R2 audit with round size nj = j. That is, the round schedule of a B2 audit is [1, 2, . . . , j, . . .].
Round size choices may be made at any time before a single ballot is drawn for the round. That is, the value of nj
may be chosen at any time before the jth round begins. In particular, it may be chosen after the stopping decision
for round j − 1, as long as this choice is made before the first ballot of round j is drawn. The choices may be driven
by external considerations or estimates and specific round sizes are not required by the stopping rule. The number of
ballots drawn for the winner is a random variable, while round size, as an external constant, is not. The total number
of ballots drawn at any time during the audit is denoted n (if the number of rounds drawn so far is j, n = nj). The
random variable representing the number of ballots drawn so far for the winner is represented by k. We use k∗, k∗ and
k˜ to represent specific numbers of winner ballots as well.
The entire sample drawn up to the jth round, in sequence, forms the signal or the observation; the corresponding
random variable is denoted Xj , the specific value xj . The entire sample drawn so far is denoted X , its specific value
x. We do not a priori assume a last round for the audit. The audit stops when it satisfies the stopping condition.
2.1 The general audit
We model the audit as a binary hypothesis test:
Null hypothesis H0: The election outcome is incorrect: w 6= wa and p = 12 . In particular, if the total number of
valid votes is even, the election is a tie. If the total number of valid votes is odd, the margin is one in favor of `a. In
this case, we assume that the number of valid votes is large enough that p is sufficiently close to 12 . Henceforth, we
will refer to both cases as being represented by p = 12 .
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Alternate hypothesis Ha: The election outcome is correct: w = wa. In particular, Ha is a model of the underlying
vote distribution of the correct outcome.
After each round the test A takes X as input and outputs one of the following:
• Correct: The test estimates that w = wa and the audit should stop.
• Incorrect: The test estimates that w 6= wa. We stop drawing votes and proceed to perform a complete hand
count to determine w.
• Undetermined (draw more samples): We need to draw more ballots to improve the estimate.
When the audit stops, it can make one of two kinds of errors:
1. Miss: A miss occurs when w 6= wa but the audit misses this, and outputs Correct. We denote by PM the
probability of a miss:
PM = Pr[A(X) = Correct | H0]
PM is the risk in risk limiting audits and the Type I error of the test.
2. Unnecessary Hand Count: Similarly, if w = wa, but the audit estimates that a hand count must follow, the hand
count is unnecessary. We denote the probability of an unnecessary hand count by PU :
PU = Pr[A(X) = Incorrect | Ha]
PU is the Type II error.
For this paper, we require that all audits have PU = 0. The risk, on the other hand, is an important (generally) non-zero
value characterizing the quality of the audit.
2.2 Risk Limiting Audits (RLAs)
A risk-limiting audit (RLA) with risk limit α—as described by, for example, Lindeman and Stark [1]—is one for which
the risk is smaller than α for all possible (unknown) true tallies in the election. For convenience when we compare
audits, we refer to this audit as an α-RLA.
Definition 1 (Risk Limiting Audit (α-RLA)). An audit A is a Risk Limiting Audit with risk limit α iff
P [A(X) = Correct | H0] ≤ α
There are many audits that would satisfy the α-RLA criterion, and not all would be desirable. For example, the constant
audit which always outputs Incorrect always requires a hand count and is risk-limiting with PM = 0 < α, ∀α, ∀p.
However, PU = 1, and the audit examines all votes each time; this is undesirable.
An example of an α-RLA with PU = 0 and drawing fewer ballots is the B2 BRAVO audit [2] which specifies round
size increments of one.
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Definition 2 (BRAVO). An audit A is the B2 (α, p)-BRAVO audit iff the following stopping condition is tested at each
ballot draw. If the sample X is of size n and has k ballots for the winner,
A(S) =

Correct σ(k, p, n) , p
k(1−p)n−k
( 12 )
n ≥ 1α
Undetermined (draw more samples) else
(1)
Its p-value is σ(k, p, n)−1.
σ(k, p, n) is the likelihood ratio of the drawn sequence X .
The B2 (α, p)-BRAVO audit is an SPRT [10] with:
H0, the null hypothesis: the election is a tie
Ha, the alternate hypothesis: the fractional tally for the winner is p.
Implicit in Definition 2 is the point that a sequence X is tested only if it has not previously satisfied the test. If
A(X∗) = Correct for some sequence X∗, all extensions X+∗ of X∗ are defined as having passed the test. Deter-
mining the stopping condition by evaluating A(X+∗ ) does not satisfy the assumptions of the test, and the properties of
the test do not necessarily apply. As we shall see in Section 3, this is relevant to end-of-round BRAVO. In fact, it is
relevant to end-of-round applications of any B2 audit that is an SPRT.
B2 BRAVO is a most efficient test given the hypotheses (if the stopping condition is satisfied exactly every time). Vora
shows [9] that B2 (α, p)-BRAVO is an α-RLA because it assumes a tie for H0, which is the wrong election outcome
that is hardest to distinguish from the announced one, and hence defines the worst-case risk [9].
3 The Problem
In this section we use an example to illustrate the problems of using B2 rules for an R2 audit.
The B2 (α, p)-BRAVO audit, Definition 2, is the following ratio test (inequality (1)) performed after each draw:
σ(k, p, n) =
pk(1− p)n−k
( 12 )
n
≥ 1
α
Because p > 1 − p and the denominator above does not depend on k, σ(k, p, n) is monotone increasing with k.
There is hence a minimum value of k for which the B2 (α, p)-BRAVO stopping condition is satisfied. That is,
∃ kmin(BRAVO, n, p, α) such that the stopping condition of Definition 2, inequality (1), is:
A(S) = Correct⇔ k ≥ kmin(BRAVO, n, p, α)
In fact it is easy to see that kmin(BRAVO, n, p, α) is a discretized straight line as a function of n, with slope and
intercept determined by p and α (see, for example, [10]).
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kmin(BRAVO, n, p, α) = dm(BRAVO, p, α) · n+ c(BRAVO, p, α)e (2)
where
m(BRAVO, p, α) =
log
1
2
1−p
log p1−p
c(BRAVO, p, α) = − logα
log p1−p
We drop one or more arguments of kmin, c or m when they are obvious.
Example 1 (B2 BRAVO vs R2 BRAVO). Let α = 0.1 and p = 0.75, we get, from equation (2):
kmin(BRAVO, n, 0.75, 0.1) ≈ d0.6309n+ 2.0959e
Consider ballots drawn in rounds of size 20, 40, 60, . . . and the BRAVO condition being tested:
• End-of-Round, which requires a record simply of the tally of the sample polled.
• Selection-ordered-ballots, requires a record of the vote on each ballot polled, in selection order.
Note that the stopping condition is always the BRAVO stopping condition; the variation is in when it is checked.
Figure 1 is a plot of kmin(BRAVO, n, 0.75, 0.1) as a function of round size. It also shows the results of the tests above,
performed on an example sequence.
• For a hypothetical sequence, selection-ordered-ballots BRAVO checks the stopping condition at the blue squares
till the stopping condition is satisfied, and the audit stops. It has information about the number of ballots for the
winner and the total number of ballots drawn at each ballot draw.
• If the same sequence were to go through an end-of-round BRAVO audit, the stopping condition would be checked
only at the end of the round, denoted in the figure by black crosses. The audit only has information on vote tallies
at the end of the round.
We see that the stopping condition is satisfied during the second round, at n = 22, but that it is no longer satisfied
when it is tested at the end of that round, at n = 40, or the following round, n = 60. It is satisfied at the end of the
fourth round, n = 80, which is the number of ballots drawn in an end-of-round BRAVO audit.
Thus:
• B2 BRAVO ends at n = 22, and 22 ballots are drawn.
• End-of-round BRAVO ends at n = 80 and 80 ballots are drawn.
• Selection-ordered-ballots BRAVO ends at n = 22, and 40 ballots are drawn.
The instance of selection-ordered-ballots BRAVO in our example would stop at the end of the second round after 40
ballots are drawn. Such an audit is risk-limiting even though the condition is not satisfied at the 40th draw. This is
because every time a sequence X satisfies the stopping condition, all extensions of it are defined as having passed
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Figure 1: Using BRAVO for a round-by-round audit with p = 0.75, α = 0.1 and round size = 20.
the audit as well. In the event that the election outcome is incorrect, any sequence that passes the audit contributes to
the risk. A risk-limiting audit ensures that the total risk contribution of all sequences that satisfy the audit is bounded
above by the risk limit, whatever the underlying election. This accounting naturally includes risk contributions of all
extensions of sequences that pass the audit as well.
Note, however, that selection-ordered-ballots discards the extra information contained in the 18 ballots drawn follow-
ing the 22-ballot draw. It ought to be possible to include this information, obtained at some cost, to better estimate
the correctness of the election outcome. (Imagine telling election officials and the public that the p-value of the draw
was small enough earlier, that it is not any more, and the math allows us to use the earlier value because if the election
outcome is incorrect, it is accounted for in the risk limit). We need not be limited by the B2 BRAVO rules which
begin with a large disadvantage when used for R2 audits, as they do not take into account that the ballots are drawn in
rounds.
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4 An Introduction to the ATHENA Class of Audits
In this section, we use an example to illustrate the workings of a proposed new R2 audit MINERVA. In later sections,
we provide more rigorous descriptions of the ATHENA class of R2 audits which we prove are risk-limiting and at least
as efficient as end-of-round BRAVO.
Example 2 (End-of-Round (0.1, 0.75)-BRAVO). We consider the end-of-round (0.1, 0.75)-BRAVO audit as in the
previous section. Denote by n1 the number of ballots drawn in the first round, and by k1 those for the winner.
Suppose n1 = 50. Figure 2 shows the probability distributions of k1 for the two hypotheses:
Ha: the election is as announced, with p = 0.75 (blue solid curve), and
H0: the election is a tie (red dashed curve).
We will continue to refer to Figure 2 in the following sections, when we will address the shaded areas.
Figure 2: Probability Distribution of Winner Votes for p = 0.75 and n1 = 50: First Round.
Suppose k1 = 32. The B2 (0.1, 0.75)-BRAVO stopping condition (see inequality(1)) tested end-of-round is:
σ(k1, p, n1) =
pk1(1− p)n1−k1
( 12 )
n1
=
(
n1
k1
)
pk1(1− p)n1−k1(
n1
k1
)
( 12 )
n1
=
Pr[k1 = 32 | Ha]
Pr[k1 = 32 | H0] ≥
1
α
(3)
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For our particular example, Figure 2, the likelihood ratio above is:
σ(32, 0.75, 50) =
Pr[k1 = 32 | Ha]
Pr[k1 = 32 | H0] ≈
0.0264
0.0160
≈ 1.65 6≥ 1
α
= 10
And the sample does not pass the end-of-round BRAVO audit. Recall that the B2 BRAVO p-value is the reciprocal of
the above probability ratio. In this example, it is ≈ 0.6061 > α = 0.1.
This is consistent with the fact that (see Example 1, Section 3):
32 < kmin(BRAVO, 50, 0.75, 0.1) = d0.6309 · 50 + 2.0959e = 34 (4)
4.1 The MINERVA Audit
We propose the ATHENA class of audits, which use the tails of the probability distribution functions to define the
stopping condition. Here we provide an informal description of the simplest of the ATHENA class, the MINERVA
audit.
Example 3 (The MINERVA Audit). For the parameters of Example 2, α = 0.1, p = 0.75, n1 = 50 and k1 = 32, we
describe the MINERVA stopping condition, a comparison test of the ratio of the tails of the distributions:
τ1(32, p, n1) =
Pr[k1 ≥ 32 | Ha, n1]
Pr[k1 ≥ 32 | H0, n1] ≥
1
α
(5)
Compare this to the stopping condition for BRAVO, inequality (3).
Note that Pr[k1 ≥ 32 | Ha] is the stopping probability for round 1 (the probability that the audit will stop in round 1
given Ha) associated with deciding to stop at k1 = 32—and not at smaller values. It is the tail of the solid blue curve,
the translucent blue area in Figure 2. Similarly, Pr[k1 = 32 | H0] is the associated risk. It is the tail of the red dashed
curve denoting the tied election, and shaded red.
For our example, the ratio of the tails of the two curves of Figure 2 is (the values are not denoted in the figure):
τ1(32, 0.75, 50) =
Pr[k1 ≥ 32 | Ha, n1]
Pr[k1 ≥ 32 | H0, n1] ≈
0.9713
0.0325
≈ 29.89 > 1
α
= 10
And the sample passes the MINERVA audit.
4.2 The MINERVA audit is risk-limiting
We will prove in Section 7 that the MINERVA stopping condition is monotonic increasing as a function of k1; one
may understand this informally as follows. As explained in Section 3, σ(k1, p, n1) is monotone increasing with k1.
The MINERVA ratio τ1(k1, p, n1) is a weighted average of the values of σ(k, p, n1) for k ≥ k1 and is also, hence,
monotone increasing with k1. If a sample with 32 winner ballots of a total of 50 ballots were to satisfy the stopping
condition, so would all samples with k1 ≥ 32.
Smaller values of k1 are associated with larger tails in both curves of Figure 2; and the tails denote the stopping
probability (given Ha, the translucent blue tail of the solid blue curve) and the risk (given H0, the solid red tail of
the dashed red curve). The smaller the value of k1, hence, the larger the associated stopping probability and risk. We
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could simply choose the smallest acceptable k1 so that the associated risk is α, but then we could not plan to ever go to
another round because we would have exhausted the risk budget in the first round. For the Minerva audit, we choose
k1 so that the risk is no larger than α times the stopping probability. This allows us to go on to an indefinite number of
rounds.
Let Rj and Sj be informally defined as follows (more formal definitions follow in Sections 6 and 5):
Rj = Pr[MINERVA audit stops in round j and no earlier | H0]
and
Sj = Pr[MINERVA audit stops in round j and no earlier | Ha]
We define Rj and Sj more carefully in section 7 and describe how to compute these values in section 5. Loosely
speaking, the denote the risk associated with the jth round and the stopping probability of the jth round.
The MINERVA stopping condition is:
Rj
Sj
≤ α⇒ Rj ≤ α · Sj
If R is the risk of the audit and S its stopping probability,
R =
∑
j
Rj ≤ α
∑
j
Sj ≤ α · S ≤ α
because S, the stopping probability of the audit, is no larger than 1.
In other words, the total risk of the audit is the sum of the risks of each individual round. The stopping condition
ensures that each of these risks is no larger than α times the corresponding stopping probability. Adding all the risks
gives us the total risk, which is no larger than α times the total stopping probability. Because the total stopping
probability cannot be larger than one, the total risk cannot be larger than α, and MINERVA is risk-limiting.
4.3 MINERVA is at least as efficient as end-of-round BRAVO
In this section, we further examine the audit of our previous examples to understand the behavior of the ratios of
BRAVO and MINERVA, σ(k1, p, n1) and τ1(k1, p, n1) respectively.
Example 4 (BRAVO vs. MINERVA Ratios). For the parameters of Examples 2 and 3: p = 0.75, α = 0.1 and n1 = 50,
Figure 3 presents the likelihood ratio for end-of-round BRAVO (green solid line), σ(k1, 0.75, 50), and the tail ratio
for MINERVA (orange dashed line), τ1(k1, 0.75, 50), on a log scale. An audit satisfies the stopping condition when its
ratio equals or exceeds α−1 = 10.
We see that
σ(k1, 0.75, 50) < τ1(k1, 0.75, 50)
This means that any sample satisfying end-of-round BRAVO will also satisfy MINERVA. In fact, it will often be the
case that the MINERVA condition will be satisfied and the end-of-round BRAVO one will not.
We have seen earlier (see equation (4), Example 2) that
kmin(BRAVO, 50, 0.75, 0.1) = 34
and end-of-round BRAVO will stop for k1 ≥ 34 and no smaller values of k1. On the other hand, we see from Figure 3
that MINERVA would stop additionally for k1 = 31, 32, 33.
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Figure 3: BRAVO and Minerva comparison tests for p = 0.75 and n1 = 50: First Round.
The reason for MINERVA stopping at smaller values of k1 is as follows. Consider k1 = 32. While
σ(32, 0.75, 50) ≈ 1.6458 < 10
σ(k1, 0.75, 50) can be much larger for larger values of k1. The MINERVA ratio, τ1, at k1 = 32 is a weighted average
of all the values of σ(k1, 0.75, 50) for k1 ≥ 32, allowing the larger values of σ(k1, 0.75, 50) to “make up” for the
smaller ones; in fact, τ1 = 30.356 for k1 = 32.
In other words, because the end-of-round BRAVO ratio increases as k1 increases, the weighted average, the MINERVA
ratio, will always be larger than the end-of-round BRAVO ratio except if k is the largest possible number of winner
votes, in which case the two ratios will be equal. Equivalently, the MINERVA p-value will always be smaller except
when k is the largest possible number of winner votes, and the p-values are equal. Thus, MINERVA is at least as
efficient.
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4.4 The ATHENA audit
In this section we present an example introducing the ATHENA audit.
Example 5. We can see from Figure 3 that the MINERVA tail ratio at k = 31 is larger than α−1. However, the
end-of-round BRAVO ratio is smaller than 1:
σ(31, 0.75, 50) < 1⇒ Pr[k = 31 | Ha] < Pr[k = 31 | H0]
which means that the observation k1 = 31 is more likely given H0 (the election is a tie) than it is given Ha (the
election is as announced)!
This is technically not an issue; it simply means that MINERVA can stop in such a situation and be risk-limiting. We
could also choose to enforce an additional stopping condition of a lower bound on the likelihood ratio of the sample.
If the sample x satisfies the MINERVA condition and is of size n with k∗ votes for the winner, the additional stopping
condition would be:
Pr[X = x | Ha]
Pr[X = x | H0] = σ(k
∗, p, n) ≥ 1
δ
for some δ. We term this combination of two stopping conditions the ATHENA audit.
A reasonable choice is δ = 1 (the observation is at least as likely given Ha as it is given H0). We would, of course,
not desire δ < α, because we would then be requiring the satisfaction of the BRAVO condition with risk limit δ < α.
We can see from Figure 3 that the ATHENA condition for δ = 1 is satisfied for k∗ ≥ 32 and no smaller values of k1.
Recall that MINERVA stops for k1 ≥ 31. Thus, MINERVA would stop for k1 = 31 and ATHENA would not.
In our experiments we have observed samples satisfying MINERVA but not ATHENA when the election margin is wide,
as in our example. Hence, clearly, ATHENA is not as efficient as MINERVA, because it imposes an additional condition.
One may think of MINERVA as determining whether the election outcome is correct, and ATHENA determining, in
addition, if the election tally is close enough to the announced tally.
5 Computing Risks and Stopping Probabilities for Multiple-Round Audits
In this section we describe how probability distributions may be computed in multiple round audits with monotone
stopping conditions; that is, audits where the stopping condition is represented through the use of kmin. We use
examples to demonstrate how the probability distributions may be computed for rounds 2 and above.
Example 6 (Testing the Stopping Condition). Consider an election with p = 0.75 and a risk limit of α = 0.1. Suppose
the first round size is n1 = 50 and the draw results in k1 = 30 ballots for the announced winner. Recall that (see
equation (4), Example 2)
kmin(BRAVO, 50, 0.75, 0.1) = 34.
and (see Figure 3, Example 4)
kmin(MINERVA, 50, 0.75, 0.1) = 31
Thus the sample passes neither the MINERVA nor the end-of-round BRAVO audit.
Now suppose we draw 50 more ballots to get n2 = 100 ballots in all, of which k2 are for the winner. We will need to
compute the probability distribution on k2 to determine the ratio of the tails for the MINERVA stopping condition.
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Note that the probability distribution of k2 is not the binomial distribution for a sample size of 100. In fact, if the audit
did not stop in the first round, k1 < 31 for MINERVA, which means that k2 can be no larger than 80, even if all 50
ballots in the second round are for the announced winner. Similarly, k2 for the end-of-round BRAVO audit can be no
larger than 83.
If the audit continues, the maximum number of ballots before new ones are drawn is 33 for BRAVO and 30 for
MINERVA. The probability distributions before the new sample is drawn are as shown in Figures 4 and 5, and may be
denoted as:
Pr[k1 ∧ (AB(X1) 6= Correct) | Ha], P r[k1 ∧ (AB(X1) 6= Correct) | H0]
and
Pr[k1 ∧ (AM(X1) 6= Correct) | Ha], P r[k1 ∧ (AM(X1) 6= Correct) | H0]
where AB and AM denote the end-of-round BRAVO and MINERVA audits for the given parameters.
Figure 4: Probability Distribution of Winner Ballots for end-of-round BRAVO: p = 0.75, n1 = 50: After Testing the
Stopping Condition for the First Round.
The “discarded” tails, in both cases, represent the probabilities that the audit stops. When this is conditional on Ha,
we refer to it as the stopping probability of the round (S1), large values are good. When it is conditional on H0, it is
the worst-case risk corresponding to the round (R1), large values are bad. Recall that our stopping condition bounds
the worst-case risk for the round to be no larger than a fraction α of the stopping probability.
Using the above probability distributions, we can now compute the distribution of ballots for the announced winner in
the sample of size 100, which we obtain after drawing 50 more ballots.
Example 7 (Second Round Distribution). Continuing with Example 6, we consider an election with p = 0.75, risk
limit α = 0.1 and round sizes n1 = 50, n2 = 100. We wish to compute the probability distribution for k2, the number
of votes for the announced winner after drawing the second round of ballots. Recall that (see equation (4), Example
2)
kmin(BRAVO, 50, 0.75, 0.1) = 34.
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Figure 5: Probability Distribution of Winner Ballots for MINERVA: p = 0.75, n1 = 50: After Testing the Stopping
Condition for the First Round.
and (see Figure 3, Example 4)
kmin(MINERVA, 50, 0.75, 0.1) = 31
First consider the end-of-round BRAVO audit. After the first round stopping condition is tested, and the audit stopped
if the condition is satisfied, the number of votes for the winner is at most 33. Let k1 be the number of votes for the
winner. Then k1 lies between 0 and 33. It is distributed as in Figure 4, and we denote the distribution by f .
There would be a total of k2 winner ballots in the sample after the second draw if k2 − k1 winner ballots were drawn
among the 50 new ballots drawn in round 2. k2 − k1 could be any value between 0 and 50, and its distribution is the
binomial distribution for the draw of size 50.
If we denote the distribution of k2 as g, it is:
g(k2) =
min{kmin−1,k2}∑
k1=max{0,k2−50}
f(k1) · binomial(k2 − k1, 50, p)
where binomial(j, n, p) is the probability of drawing j votes for the announced winner in a sample of size n, when
the fractional vote for the announced winner is p.
The above expression is known as the convolution of f and binomial, and is denoted:
g = f ~ binomial
where ~ represents the convolution operator. The convolution of two functions can be computed efficiently using
Fourier Transforms; this result is the convolution theorem.
After drawing the second sample, the probability distributions for BRAVO are as in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Probability Distribution of Winner Ballots for end-of-round BRAVO: p = 0.75, n1 = 50, n2 = 100: After
Drawing the Second Round.
Similarly, for MINERVA, k1 lies between 0 and 30. k2 is similarly the convolution of the function(s) represented in
Figure 5 and the binomial distribution corresponding to a draw of 50 ballots for the respective hypotheses. After
drawing the second sample, the probability distributions for MINERVA are as in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Probability Distribution of Winner Ballots for MINERVA: p = 0.75, n1 = 50, n2 = 100: After Drawing the
Second Round.
In order to compute probability distributions for the next round, we would first compute the value of kmin for this
round using the tail ratio, then zero the probability distributions for the value of kmin and above, and then perform a
convolution with the binomial distribution corresponding to the size of the next draw. And so on.
Probability distributions for B2 audits may be computed similarly, with the round schedule: (1, 2, . . . , i, . . .). We used
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this approach to compute percentiles for the BRAVO stopping probabilities; see Section 8 for the results.
6 The ATHENA Class of Audits
In this section we rigorously describe MINERVA and ATHENA, two audits from the new ATHENA class of risk-limiting
audits. The stopping condition for BRAVO is a comparison test for the ratio of probabilities of the number of winner
ballots. On the other hand, the stopping conditions for the ATHENA class are comparison tests for the ratio of the
complementary cumulative distribution functions (cdfs). For the ATHENA class of audits, the stopping condition for a
given round does depend on previous round sizes, which are required to compute the complementary cdfs, but not on
future round sizes.
6.1 The MINERVA audit
Given the B2 (α, p)-BRAVO test we define the corresponding R2 MINERVA test by its stopping condition, which is a
comparison test of the ratio of the complementary cdfs of samples that did not satisfy the stopping condition for any
previous round. We expect that similar R2 MINERVA tests can be defined for other SPRTs with zero error of the second
kind whose probability ratio is a monotonic increasing function of k, such as Bayesian audits, but do not address these
in this paper.
Definition 3 ((α, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .))-MINERVA). Given B2 (α, p)-BRAVO and round sizes n1, n2, . . . , nj . . ., the
corresponding R2 MINERVA stopping rule for the (j + 1)th round is:
A(Xj+1) =

Correct τj+1(kj+1, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), α) ≥ 1α
Undetermined (draw more samples) else
(6)
where τj+1 is the complementary cumulative distribution ratio for the j + 1th round:
τj+1(kj+1, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), α) =
Pr[k ≥ kj+1 ∧ ∀i≤j(A(Xi) 6= Correct) | Ha, nj+1]
Pr[k ≥ kj+1 ∧ ∀i≤j(A(Xi) 6= Correct) | tie, nj+1] j ≥ 1 (7)
and, as with B2 (α, p)-BRAVO, Ha, the alternate hypothesis, is that the fractional tally for the winner is p.
Clearly, for j = 0 and the first round,
τ1(k1, p, n1) =
Pr[k ≥ k1 | Ha, n1]
Pr[k ≥ k1 | tie, n1]
6.2 The ATHENA audit
In addition to comparing the ratio of complementary cumulative distribution functions as in MINERVA, the ATHENA
audit also enforces a lower bound on the probability ratio, σ, of the B2 (α, p)-BRAVO test.
Definition 4 ((α, δ, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .))-ATHENA). Given B2 (α, p)-BRAVO, round sizes n1, n2, . . . , nj . . . and
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parameter δ, the corresponding ATHENA stopping rule for the (j + 1)th round is:
A(Xj+1) =

Correct ωj+1(kj+1, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .)) ≥ 1α
∧σ(kj+1, p, nj+1) ≥ 1δ
Undetermined (draw more samples) else
(8)
where ωj+1 is the complementary cumulative distribution ratio for the (j + 1)th round:
ωj+1(kj+1, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), α, δ) =
Pr[k ≥ kj+1 ∧ ∀i≤j(A(Si) 6= Correct) | Ha, nj+1]
Pr[k ≥ kj+1 ∧ ∀i≤j(A(Xi) 6= Correct) | tie, nj+1] j ≥ 1 (9)
σ(kj+1, p, nj+1) =
pkj+1(1− p)nj+1−kj+1
( 12 )
nj+1
j ≥ 1
and, as with B2 (α, p)-BRAVO, Ha, the alternate hypothesis, is that the fractional tally for the winner is p.
Clearly, for j = 0 and the first round,
ω1(k1, p, n1) =
Pr[k ≥ k1 | Ha, n1]
Pr[k ≥ k1 | tie, n1]
We further define the risk and stopping probability associated with each round.
Definition 5 (Sj). The probability of stopping in the jth round for audit A is defined as:
Sj = Pr[(A(Xj) = Correct) ∧ ∀i<j(A(Xi) 6= Correct) | Ha, nj ]
Definition 6 (Rj). The risk of the jth round of audit A is defined as:
Rj = Pr[(A(Xj) = Correct) ∧ ∀i<j(A(Xi) 6= Correct) | H0, nj ]
7 Risk-Limiting Properties of the ATHENA Class of Audits
In this section we present the risk-limiting and efficiency properties of MINERVA and ATHENA. We begin with an
outline of our approach. Rigorous statements follow and proofs are in the Appendix.
7.1 An outline of the proofs
In this section we provide an outline of the claims and proofs.
Using induction on the number of rounds, we prove a couple of interesting properties, including, at the core, that the
likelihood ratio of k (total number of winner ballots) in the jth round is
Pr[kj = k ∧ ∀i<j(A(Xi) 6= Correct) | Ha, nj ]
Pr[kj = k ∧ ∀i<j(A(Xi) 6= Correct) | H0, nj ] = σ(k, p, n) ,
pk(1− p)n−k
( 12 )
n
That is, for k winner ballots in round j, when sequences are restricted to those that did not satisfy stopping conditions in
previous rounds, the likelihood ratio of k is simply σ(k, p, n), independent of any additional constraints on sequence
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order and the past or future round schedule. This property leads to the result that the test in the jth round is a
comparison test for k.
For the base case, it is easily shown that the likelihood ratio of k in the first round is σ(k, p, n), as there is no previous
round:
Pr[k1 = k | Ha, n]
Pr[k1 = k | H0, n] =
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k(
n
k
)
( 12 )
n
= σ(k, p, n)
σ(k, p, n) is easily seen to be monotone increasing with k because p > 12 .
The induction step proceeds as follows. Suppose the likelihood ratio for the number of winner ballots in round j is
σ(k, p, n). The ratios used for the stopping conditions of the jth round in MINERVA and ATHENA
τj(k, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), α)
and
ωj(k, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), α, δ)
respectively, are weighted sums of σ(kj , p, n) for kj ≥ k. Because σ(kj , p, n) is monotone increasing with kj , the
respective stopping conditions are monotone increasing with k, and can be expressed as comparison tests for k.
ATHENA has two conditions. The second one is a comparison test for the likelihood ratio, and hence also equivalent
to a comparison test for the number of winner ballots. The overall comparison test is the stricter of the two, and is also
a comparison test. Thus the stopping condition for round j is a test of the form k ≥ kmin,j for a kmin,j that depends
on the audit, its parameters including previous round sizes, the election parameters and the risk limit. As described in
section 4, one can use convolution to compute the probability distributions for kj+1.
To determine the nature of the likelihood ratio for round j + 1, we proceed as follows. The likelihood ratio for k in
round j is assumed to be σ(k, p, n). Hence, the distribution of k in round j given Ha is a multiple of pk(1 − p)n−k,
and that given H0 is the same multiple of ( 12 )
n. The multiplying factor itself is a function of k, current and previous
round sizes, p and α, as it captures the previous comparison tests on the number of winner ballots. On convolution,
when one obtains the distributions for round j+1, the multiplying factors change, but the one for the distribution given
Ha is the same as that for the distribution given H0. Loosely speaking, the number of ways of obtaining a sequence
with k winner ballots in a round of size n, given previous round sizes (and hence previous comparison tests for winner
ballots), is independent of the hypothesis. Thus the likelihood ratio of k in round j + 1 remains σ(k, p, n).
It is now easy to show that the audits are risk-limiting. The tail (beginning at kmin) of the probability distribution of
k in the jth round conditional on hypothesis Ha (H0) is the stopping probability (risk) associated with the jth round.
Both MINERVA and ATHENA audits require that the tail corresponding to H0 (the risk corresponding to round j) be
no more than α times the tail corresponding to Ha (the stopping probability), thus ensuring that the sum of all the risk
contributions of the rounds is no more than α times the total stopping probability, and hence no more than α.
Both MINERVA and ATHENA are more efficient than end-of-round BRAVO. This is because the ratios σ, τj and ωj
are all compared to the same value, 1α . For k winner ballots, the ratio for BRAVO is σ(k, p, n), which is monotone
increasing with k. The ratios for ATHENA and MINERVA, ωj and τj respectively, are weighted sums of σ(kj , p, n)
for kj ≥ k and hence strictly larger, unless k is the largest value with non-zero probability (it would be value of of
kmin − 1 for the previous round, plus the size of the current draw), when they are equal. Thus, if a sample satisfies
the end-of-round BRAVO condition, it also satisfies the conditions on ωj and τj . The ATHENA audit includes a second
test, which is a comparison test for σ(k, p, n). If δ ≥ α, this too is satisfied if the end-of-round BRAVO condition is
satisfied.
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We state the above claims more formally in the rest of this section, and prove them in the Appendix. We also prove
that the MINERVA and ATHENA (δ ≥ α) stopping conditions, when round increments are specified to be one, are
equivalent to the B2 BRAVO condition, though p-values are not the same except for samples where the audits stop.
7.2 Notation
We establish some shorthand notation which will be useful.
For ease of notation, when the audit and its parameters (round schedule, risk limit, fractional vote for the winner) are
fixed, we denote:
Sj(kj) , Pr[k ≥ kj ∧ ∀i<j(A(Xi) 6= Correct) | Ha, nj ]
Rj(kj) , Pr[k ≥ kj ∧ ∀i<j(A(Xi) 6= Correct) | H0, nj ]
Thus Sj(kj)Rj(kj) is the ratio of the complementary cdfs in round j when the number of winner ballots drawn is kj , and the
sequence did not satisfy the stopping condition in a previous round.
Similarly,
sj(kj) , Pr[k = kj ∧ ∀i<j(A(Xi) 6= Correct) | Ha, nj ]
and
rj(kj) , Pr[k = kj ∧ ∀i<j(A(Xi) 6= Correct) | H0, nj ]
and sj(kj)rj(kj) is the likelihood ratio of kj winner ballots in round j when the sequence did not satisfy the stopping
condition in a previous round.
Note also the following simple observation:
Sj(kj) =
nj∑
k=kj
sj(k)
Rj(kj) =
nj∑
k=kj
rj(k)
(10)
Recall that, when we do not refer to parameters at all, Sj corresponds to the stopping probability of the jth round and
is not a function of the sample drawn, but of the audit. Similarly for Rj , R and S. (See Definitions 5 and 6).
7.3 Properties of the MINERVA and ATHENA complementary cdf ratios
In this section we prove interesting properties of the MINERVA and ATHENA ratios that are necessary to prove that the
audits are risk-limiting.
Note that the B2 (α, p)-BRAVO stopping condition is based on σ(k, p, n):
σ(k, p, n) =
pk(1− p)n−k
( 12 )
n
where the history of round size is completely captured in the total number of ballots drawn, n.
We prove that σ(k, p, n) is also the likelihood ratio of winner ballots in all rounds of the MINERVA and ATHENA
audits, even though round sizes are not constrained in any way. We additionally prove other interesting properties.
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Theorem 1. For the (α, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .))-MINERVA test, the following are true for j = 1, 2, 3, . . .
1.
sj(kj)
rj(kj)
= σ(kj , p, nj)
when rj(kj) and sj(kj) are defined and non-zero.
2. τj(kj , p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), α) is monotone increasing as a function of kj .
3. ∃kmin,j(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α) such that
A(Xj) = Correct⇔ kj ≥ kmin,j(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α)
Similarly:
Theorem 2. For the (α, δ, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .))-ATHENA test, the following are true for j = 1, 2, 3, . . .:
1.
sj(kj)
rj(kj)
= σ(kj , p, nj)
when rj(kj) and sj(kj) are defined and non-zero.
2. ωj(kj , p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), α, δ) is monotone increasing as a function of kj .
3. ∃kmin,j(ATHENA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α, δ) such that
A(Xj) = Correct⇔ kj ≥ kmin,j(ATHENA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α)
7.4 MINERVA and ATHENA are risk-limiting
Now we may state the results on the risk limiting properties of the audits.
Theorem 3. (α,Ha, (n1, n2, . . . , nr, . . .))-MINERVA is an α-RLA.
Exactly the same approach may be used to prove:
Theorem 4. (α, δ,Ha, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .))-ATHENA is an α-RLA.
7.5 Properties of B2 versions of MINERVA and ATHENA
In this section we study the relationship between B2 BRAVO and MINERVA with each round consisting of a single bal-
lot draw. We make the following observation: samples satisfying the stopping condition of (α, p)-BRAVO, performed
ballot-by-ballot, are exactly those satisfying that of the (α,Ha, (1, 2, 3, . . . , j, . . .))-MINERVA audit, where Ha is the
hypothesis that the winner’s fractional tally is p. The p-values of the two audits, however, differ except at their values
of kmin.
Theorem 5. The B2 (α, p)-BRAVO audit stops for a sample of size nj with kj ballots for the winner, if and only if the
(α,Ha, (1, 2, 3, . . . , j, . . .))-MINERVA audit stops.
Corollary 1. Given α, p, δ such that δ ≥ α, the B2 (α, p)-BRAVO audit stops for a sample of size nj with kj ballots
for the winner, if and only if the (α, δ,Ha, (1, 2, 3, . . . , j, . . .))-ATHENA audit stops.
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7.6 Strong RLAs
We define a new audit property which characterizes the difference between MINERVA and ATHENA.
Definition 7 (Strong Risk Limiting Audit (α, δ)-RLA). An audit procedure A is an (α, δ)-Strong Risk Limiting Audit
if it is a Risk Limiting Audit with risk level α and, if, for every accepted sample, the likelihood-ratio is bounded below
by 1δ :
A(S) = correct⇒ Pr[S | Ha]
Pr[S | H0] ≥
1
δ
It is easy to see that:
Lemma 1. B2 BRAVO, end-of-round BRAVO and selection-ordered-ballots BRAVO are (α, α)-strong RLAs.
7.7 Efficiency
In this section we present an efficiency result for MINERVA and ATHENA (for δ ≥ α).
Theorem 6. Given sample X of size nj with kj samples for the winner,
AB(X) = Correct⇒ AA(X) = Correct
where AB denotes the (α, p)-BRAVO test and AA the (α, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .))-MINERVA test or the
(α, δ, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .))-ATHENA test for δ ≥ α.
From this it follows that MINERVA and ATHENA (for δ ≥ α) is each at least as efficient as the corresponding end-of-
round application of B2 rules. In section 8.2 we demonstrate that ATHENA and MINERVA can be considerably more
efficient.
8 Experimental Results
In this section we describe our experimental results. We first present our analytical results for percentiles of the BRAVO
stopping condition, and compare them with those reported by Lindeman et al. [2, Table 1]. We then describe our
estimates of first round sizes, comparing ATHENA (δ = 1) to both end-of-round BRAVO and selection-ordered-ballots
BRAVO.
8.1 B2 BRAVO Percentile Verification
We used the approach described in Section 5 to generate the probability distributions for B2 BRAVO using various
election margins to see how our estimates compared to those obtained by Lindeman et al. [2, Table 1]. They used
10, 000 simulations.
Table 1 presents our values. Values in parentheses are from [2, Table 1], where they differ. Much of the difference is
likely due to rounding off. The largest difference is 190 ballots, corresponding to a fractional difference of 0.41 %,
in the estimate of the expected number of ballots drawn for a margin of 1%. The average of the absolute value of the
fractional difference between our results and those of [2] is 0.13%.
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Margin 25th 50th 75th 90th 99th Expected Ballots ASN
0.4 12 22 38 60 131 29.47 30.03
(30) (30)
0.3 23 38 66 108 236 52.83 53.25
(53) (53)
0.2 49 84 149 244 538 118.00 118.88
(119) (119)
0.18 77 131 231 381 842 183.60 184.89
(840) (184) (185)
0.1 193 332 587 974 2,155 466.47 469.26
(2,157) (469) (469)
0.08 301 518 916 1,520 3,366 726.95 730.80
(730) (731)
0.06 531 914 1,621 2,698 5,976 1,287.60 1,294.62
(1,619) (2,700) (5,980) (1,294) (1,295)
0.04 1,190 2,051 3,637 6,055 13,433 2,887.28 2,901.97
(1,188) (6,053) (13,455) (2,900) (2,902)
0.02 4,727 8,161 14,493 24,155 53,646 11,506.45 11,561.66
(4,725) (8,157) (14,486) (24,149) (53,640) (11,556) (11,562)
0.01 18,845 32,566 57,856 96,469 214,385 45,935.85 46,150.44
(18,839) (32,547) (57,838) (96,411) (214,491) (46,126) (46,150)
Table 1: Computed Estimates of B2 BRAVO Stopping Probabilities. Values in parentheses are those from [2, Table 1]
that differ.
The differences could be because: we compute our probability distributions for only up to 6ASN draws; we model the
discrete character of the problem, which is not captured by ASN; 10, 000 simulations may not be sufficiently accurate
at the lower margins, where most of the errors are.
8.2 First-round estimates
In this section we report the results of our estimates for first round sizes for 90% stopping probability for both end-of-
round BRAVO and ATHENA (δ = 1), for the announced statewide results of the 2016 US Presidential election. Our
results are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
We constructed a table of stopping probability as a function of round size for a given margin, where the stopping
probability of a round is the tail corresponding to the kmin value for that round size. We observed that the stopping
probability is not a monotone increasing function of round size. This is because, if kmin increases with round size (it
does not decrease, but it may remain the same), the stopping probability may decrease slightly. For our first-round-size
computations reported in section 8, we use the more conservative estimates: given a desired stopping probability ρ, we
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chose round sizes such that all larger rounds stopped with probability at least ρ. For small margins, smaller than 0.05
(except the states of Michigan and New Hampshire, which had the smallest margin), we did not construct the entire
table, but began looking for the values by checking if the values of k with the requisite tail size satisfied the stopping
condition. Finally, for the states of Michigan and New Hampshire, we approximated round size by estimating the
binomial as a gaussian.
We first examined the relationship between end-of-round BRAVO and ATHENA (δ = 1) first-round sizes. We estimated
the stopping probability and the first-round sizes for end-of-round BRAVO as described above. We use the round size
beyond which the stopping probability is at least 90% for both end-of-round BRAVO and ATHENA, thus our round-size
estimates are conservative. We scaled these estimates by the ratio of total ballots cast to the number of valid ballots
in the contest between the two leading candidates, Trump and Clinton. Better estimates would result from taking into
consideration every possible margin for every round size. Our approach, however, is sufficient for the purposes of a
rough comparison (we have developed software for the more accurate approach; it is being tested). Of course, some
of these sizes are too large for consideration in a real audit; in particular, the round size for New Hampshire is more
than the number of ballots cast in the election.
It is noteworthy that, across all margins, ATHENA first round sizes are about half those of end-of-round BRAVO.
We also estimate first round sizes for 90% stopping probability for selection-ordered-ballots BRAVO by treating it as a
multiple-round audit. We use the approach described in Section 5, for which our verification results were presented in
Section 8.1. Our results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. We currently omit estimates for states with margins smaller
than 0.01. In the other states, we observe that the improvement on using ATHENA (δ = 1) is 15%− 29%, with greater
improvements for smaller margins. Recall that, unlike selection-ordered-ballots BRAVO, ATHENA does not require
that the ballots be noted in selection order; sample tallies are sufficient.
We also present the same data in the form of plots. Figure 8 plots the first round sizes of ATHENA, end-of-round BRAVO
and selection-ordered-ballots BRAVO on a log scale as a function of margin. One can observe that the ATHENA round
sizes are the smallest, and the end-of-round the largest. Figure 9 plots the ATHENA round size as a fraction of the
corresponding end-of-round BRAVO and selection-ordered-ballots BRAVO round sizes. There is a small variation with
margin, with the ATHENA round sizes being smaller fractions for smaller margins (that is, the improvement from using
ATHENA is larger for smaller margins). Note that a couple of states with the largest margins do not have the largest
ratios. This is likely because the round sizes are very small, and hence a difference of a single ballot changes the ratio
considerably.
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Figure 8: First-Round Sizes for 90% stopping probability: End-of-Round BRAVO, Selection-Ordered-Ballots BRAVO
and ATHENA as a function of statewide margins of the 2016 US Presidential contest.
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Figure 9: First-Round Sizes: ATHENA first-round sizes for 90% stopping probability as a fraction of those of End-of-
Round BRAVO and Selection-Ordered-Ballots, for the statewide margins of the 2016 US Presidential contest.
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9 Conclusion
We describe inefficiencies with the use of audits developed for ballot-by-ballot decisions in round-to-round procedures,
such as are in use in real audits today. We propose new audits, MINERVA and ATHENA, which we prove are risk-
limiting and at least as efficient as audits that apply the ballot-by-ballot decision rules at the end of the round.
We describe an approach to computing stopping probabilities and risks of audits with stopping conditions that are
monotone increasing with the number of ballots for the winner in the sample. We demonstrate its accuracy in repro-
ducing the empirically-obtained percentile values from [2, Table 1], and find that the average fractional discrepancy is
0.13%.
We predict first round sizes (for 90% stopping probability) for all states in the US Presidential election of 2016 for end-
of-round BRAVO and ATHENA (δ = 1). We find that our proposed audits require half the ballots across all margins. We
similarly compare first round sizes to ordered-ballot-draw BRAVO as well, finding 15− 29% improvements, with the
larger improvements corresponding to smaller margins. We thus see that the additional effort of retaining information
on ballot order, required by selection-ordered-ballots BRAVO, is not beneficial as the ATHENA class of audits does not
require it.
We hope to present a third audit of the ATHENA class, METIS, which is more efficient for multiple-round audits, in a
future draft of this manuscript.
Large first-round sizes for polling audits of low margin contests should not deter election officials from performing
audits. Other options exist besides those reported in Section 8, which presents results for ballot polling audits only.
Ballot comparison audits are far more efficient in terms of number of ballots needed for the audit; if cast vote records
(CVRs) which can be efficiently matched with the corresponding paper ballot are easily available, or their creation
requires less effort than the random sampling of a large number of ballots, they should be considered, especially for
low margin contests. It might also be possible to perform a combination of ballot polling audits and ballot comparison
audits—such as described by Ottoboni et al. in the paper on SUITE [5]—to reduce effort.
We provide open-source software for computing probability distributions and for the MINERVA and ATHENA audits,
hoping it can help developers of election auditing software. We also hope our work can help election officials planning
audits,
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State Margin EoR BRAVO ATHENA ATHENA size as a fraction
Round Size Round Size of EoR BRAVO size
Alabama 0.2875 181 94 0.5193
Alaska 0.1677 590 295 0.5000
Arizona 0.0378 10,732 5,204 0.4849
Arkansas 0.2857 187 96 0.5134
California 0.3226 148 79 0.5338
Colorado 0.0537 5,475 2,676 0.4888
Connecticut 0.1428 748 374 0.5000
Delaware 0.1200 1,057 523 0.4948
District Of Columbia 0.9139 15 8 0.5333
Florida 0.0124 96,608 46,563 0.4820
Georgia 0.0532 5,266 2,567 0.4875
Hawaii 0.3488 128 68 0.5312
Idaho 0.3662 120 64 0.5333
Illinois 0.1804 474 242 0.5105
Indiana 0.2023 374 187 0.5000
Iowa 0.1013 1,520 753 0.4954
Kansas 0.2222 318 162 0.5094
Kentucky 0.3134 155 79 0.5097
Louisiana 0.2034 365 182 0.4986
Maine 0.0319 15,202 7,358 0.4840
Maryland 0.2803 197 98 0.4975
Massachusetts 0.2930 180 93 0.5167
Michigan 0.0024 2,618,926 1,259,688 0.4810
Minnesota 0.0166 56,680 27,421 0.4838
Mississippi 0.1818 453 224 0.4945
Table 2: Comparison of end-of-round (EoR) BRAVO and ATHENA First-Round Sizes for Statewide 2016 US Presiden-
tial Contests, for δ = 1 and a stopping probability of 0.9
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State Margin EoR BRAVO ATHENA ATHENA size as a fraction
Round Size Round Size of EoR BRAVO size
Missouri 0.1964 401 201 0.5012
Montana 0.2222 320 164 0.5125
Nebraska 0.2710 213 110 0.5164
Nevada 0.0259 22,943 11,110 0.4842
New Hampshire 0.0039 1,007,590 475,357 0.4718
New Jersey 0.1457 703 350 0.4979
New Mexico 0.0930 1,888 934 0.4947
New York 0.2354 272 140 0.5147
North Carolina 0.0381 10,330 5,000 0.4840
North Dakota 0.3962 98 55 0.5612
Ohio 0.0854 2,077 1,018 0.4901
Oklahoma 0.3861 101 55 0.5446
Oregon 0.1231 1,068 535 0.5009
Pennsylvania 0.0075 265,245 127,792 0.4818
Rhode Island 0.1662 562 280 0.4982
South Carolina 0.1492 683 344 0.5037
South Dakota 0.3194 154 79 0.5130
Tennessee 0.2725 206 106 0.5146
Texas 0.0943 1,706 833 0.4883
Utah 0.2477 329 165 0.5015
Vermont 0.3037 180 91 0.5056
Virginia 0.0565 4,790 2,329 0.4862
Washington 0.1757 525 265 0.5048
West Virginia 0.4432 76 41 0.5395
Wisconsin 0.0082 229,503 110,622 0.4820
Wyoming 0.5141 59 29 0.4915
Table 3: Comparison of end-of-round (EoR) BRAVO and ATHENA First-Round Sizes for Statewide 2016 US Presiden-
tial Contests, for δ = 1.0 and a stopping probability of 0.9, contd.
ATHENA Ballot Polling Audits 30
State Margin SB BRAVO ATHENA ATHENA size as a fraction
Round Size Round Size of SB BRAVO size
Alabama 0.2875 122 94 0.7748
Alaska 0.1677 396 295 0.7467
Arizona 0.0378 7,227 5,204 0.7202
Arkansas 0.2857 128 96 0.7538
California 0.3226 99 79 0.8015
Colorado 0.0537 3,687 2,676 0.7258
Connecticut 0.1428 502 374 0.7456
Delaware 0.1200 716 523 0.7313
District Of Columbia 0.9139 10 8 0.8440
Florida 0.0124 65,051 46,563 0.7158
Georgia 0.0532 3,555 2,567 0.7222
Hawaii 0.3488 86 68 0.7941
Idaho 0.3662 83 64 0.7711
Illinois 0.1804 318 242 0.7630
Indiana 0.2023 254 187 0.7380
Iowa 0.1013 1,024 753 0.7355
Kansas 0.2222 215 162 0.7547
Kentucky 0.3134 104 79 0.7597
Louisiana 0.2034 247 182 0.7382
Maine 0.0319 1,0238 7,358 0.7187
Maryland 0.2803 132 98 0.7448
Massachusetts 0.2930 122 93 0.7639
Michigan 0.0024 - 1,259,688 -
Minnesota 0.0166 3,8185 2,7421 0.7181
Mississippi 0.1818 302 224 0.7420
Table 4: Comparison of selection-ordered-ballots (SB) BRAVO and ATHENA First-Round Sizes for Statewide 2016
US Presidential Contests, for δ = 1 and a stopping probability of 0.9
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State Margin SB BRAVO ATHENA ATHENA size as a fraction
Round Size Round Size of SB BRAVO size
Missouri 0.1964 267 201 0.7540
Montana 0.2222 217 164 0.7575
Nebraska 0.2710 144 110 0.7646
Nevada 0.0259 15,462 11,110 0.7186
New Hampshire 0.0039 - 475,357 -
New Jersey 0.1457 478 350 0.7334
New Mexico 0.0930 1,276 934 0.7324
New York 0.2354 186 140 0.7555
North Carolina 0.0381 6,961 5,000 0.7184
North Dakota 0.3962 70 55 0.7873
Ohio 0.0854 1,403 1,018 0.7257
Oklahoma 0.3861 69 55 0.7975
Oregon 0.1231 724 535 0.7396
Pennsylvania 0.0075 - 127,792 -
Rhode Island 0.1662 382 280 0.7339
South Carolina 0.1492 460 344 0.7492
South Dakota 0.3194 102 79 0.7756
Tennessee 0.2725 138 106 0.7722
Texas 0.0943 1,150 833 0.7249
Utah 0.2477 220 165 0.7528
Vermont 0.3037 122 91 0.7464
Virginia 0.0565 3,229 2,329 0.7214
Washington 0.1757 355 265 0.7471
West Virginia 0.4432 51 41 0.8108
Wisconsin 0.0082 - 110,622 -
Wyoming 0.5141 40 29 0.7254
Table 5: Comparison of selection-ordered-ballots (SB) BRAVO and ATHENA First-Round Sizes for Statewide 2016
US Presidential Contests, for δ = 1 and a stopping probability of 0.9, contd.
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A Proofs
A.1 Preliminaries
Before we prove the Theorems, we need the following general results from basic algebra.
Lemma 2. Given a monotone increasing sequence: a1b1 ,
a2
b2
, . . . , anbn , for ai, bi > 0, the sequence:
zi =
∑n
j=i aj∑n
j=i bj
is also monotone increasing.
Proof. Note that zi is a weighted average of the values of
aj
bj
for j ≥ i:
zi =
n∑
j=i
yj
aj
bj
yj =
bj∑n
j=i bj
> 0
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n∑
j=i
yj = 1⇒ yj ≤ 1
yj = 1⇔ i = j = n
Observe that, because aibi is monotone increasing,
zi ≥ ai
bi
with equality if and only if i = n. Suppose i < n. Then:
zi+1 ≥ ai+1
bi+1
>
ai
bi
zi = yi
ai
bi
+ (1− yi)zi+1 < zi+1
And zi is also monotone increasing.
Lemma 3. Given a strictly monotone increasing sequence: x1, x2, . . . xn and some constant A,
∃imin such that xi ≥ A⇔ i ≥ imin
Proof. Let imin be the first index for which the sequence exceeds or equals A. That is, let imin be such that
ximin ≥ A xj < A 1 ≤ j < imin
Because the sequence is monotone increasing,
xi > ximin ≥ A ∀i > imin
If no elements in the sequence exceed or equal A, let imin = n+ 1.
Lemma 4. Given p, n, with p > 12 , σ(k, p, n) is strictly monotone increasing as a function of k.
Proof.
p >
1
2
⇒ p > 1− p⇒ 1− p
p
< 1
Let 0 ≤ k < n. Then:
σ(k, p, n) =
pk(1− p)n−k
( 12 )
n
=
1− p
p
· p
k+1(1− p)n−(k+1)
( 12 )
n
=
1− p
p
σ(k + 1, p, n)
Hence
σ(k, p, n) < σ(k + 1, p, n) ∀ k such that 0 ≤ k < n
A.2 Proofs of properties of the complementary cdf ratios
Theorem 1. For the (α, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .))-MINERVA test, the following are true for j = 1, 2, 3, . . .
1.
sj(kj)
rj(kj)
= σ(kj , p, nj)
when rj(kj) and sj(kj) are defined and non-zero.
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2. τj(kj , p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), α) is strictly monotone increasing as a function of kj .
3. ∃kmin,j(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α) such that
A(Xj) = Correct⇔ kj ≥ kmin,j(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α)
Proof. We show this by induction.
Consider j = 1.
1.
s1(k1)
r1(k1)
=
Pr[k = k1 | Ha, n1]
Pr[k = k1 | tie, n1] = σ(k1, p, n1)
2.
τ1(k1, p, n1) =
Pr[k ≥ k1 | Ha, n1]
Pr[k ≥ k1 | tie, n1] =
S1(k1)
R1(k1)
=
∑kmax,1
k=k1
s1(k)∑n
kmax,1
r1(k)
where kmax,j is the largest possible value for kj . Note that kmax,1 = n1.
is a weighted average of σ(k, p, n1), and, by Lemmas 2 and 4, is strictly monotone increasing as a function of
k1.
3. From Lemma 3, ∃kmin,1(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nr, . . .), p, α) such that
τ1(k1, p, n1) ≥ 1
α
⇔ k1 ≥ kmin,1(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nr, . . .), p, α)
which is the Minerva stopping condition.
Thus the theorem is true for j = 1.
Suppose the theorem is true for j = m. We will show it is true for j = m+ 1.
From property (3) of this theorem for j = m, we observe that, after the stopping decision is made and before the next
round is drawn, the number of winner ballots in the sample is strictly smaller than kmin,m(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nm, . . .), p, α).
The distribution on the winner votes may be modeled as s∗m(km) and r
∗
m(km) where:
s∗m(km) =
 sm(km) k < kmin,r(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nr, . . .), p, α)0 else
and
r∗m(km) =
 rm(km) k < kmin,m(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nr, . . .), p, α)0 else
When we draw the next round of ballots with replacement, the resulting distributions on the winner ballots are convo-
lutions:
sm+1(km+1) = s
∗
m(km)~ binomial(knew,m+1, p, nm+1 − nm)
and
rm+1(km+1) = r
∗
m(km)~ binomial(knew,m+1, 0.5, nm+1 − nm)
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where~ represents the convolution operator and binomial(k, p, n) the probability of drawing k ballots for the winner
in a sample of size n from a distribution with fractional tally p for the winner. Using property (1) of this theorem for
j = m, we see that
s∗m(km) = A(km)p
km(1− p)nm−km
and
r∗m(km) = A(km)(
1
2
)nm
for some A, a function of k, current and previous round sizes, p and α.
Some book keeping demonstrates that
sm+1(km+1) = B(km+1)p
km+1(1− p)nm+1−km+1
where
B(km+1) = A(km)~
(
nm+1 − nm
knew,m+1
)
And
rm+1(km+1) = B(km+1)(
1
2
)nm+1
which proves property (1) for j = m+ 1. Properties (2) and (3) follow for j = m+ 1 by application of Lemmas 2-4.
Thus the theorem is true for all j ≥ 1.
Theorem 2. For the (α, δ, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .))-ATHENA test, the following are true for j = 1, 2, 3, . . .:
1.
sj(kj)
rj(kj)
= σ(kj , p, nj)
when rj(kj) and sj(kj) are defined and non-zero.
2. ωj(kj , p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), α, δ) is strictly monotone increasing.
3. ∃kmin,j(ATHENA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α, δ) such that
A(Xj) = Correct⇔ kj ≥ kmin,j(ATHENA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α)
Proof. The proof proceeds exactly as that for Theorem 1, except that there are two stopping conditions, which may be
represented as:
ωj(kj , p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .)) ≥ 1
α
⇔ kj ≥ kmin,j(ω, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α)
and
σ(kj , p, nj) ≥ 1
δ
⇔ kj ≥ kmin(BRAVO, n, p, α)
Hence
kmin,j(ATHENA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α) = max(kmin,j(ω, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α), kmin(BRAVO, n, p, α))
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A.3 Proof of risk-limiting property of MINERVA
Theorem 3. (α,Ha, (n1, n2, . . . , nr, . . .))-MINERVA is an α-RLA.
Proof. From Definition 6 and Theorem 1, we have
Rj = Pr[kj ≥ kmin,j(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α) | H0, nj ]
≤ αPr[kj ≥ kmin,j(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α) | Ha, nj ]
= α · Sj
because kmin,j(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .), p, α) satisfies the MINERVA stopping condition.
Define the total stopping probability of the audit as follows:
S = Pr[(A(X) = Correct) | Ha]
Then,
S =
∑
j
Sj ≤ 1 (11)
The risk of the audit is defined as:
R = Pr[(A(X) = Correct) | H0] =
∑
j
Rj ≤ α ·
∑
j
Sj = α · S ≤ α
from Equation (11).
A.4 Properties of B2 versions of MINERVA and ATHENA
Theorem 5. The B2 (α, p)-BRAVO audit stops for a sample of size nj with kj ballots for the winner, if and only if the
(α,Ha, (1, 2, 3, . . . , j, . . .))-MINERVA audit stops.
Proof. Consider the jth round of the MINERVA audit: the jth ballot draw. Suppose that, before the jth round is drawn,
and after the stopping condition is tested for the (j − 1)th round and the audit stopped if it is satisfied, k is the largest
value of winner ballots possible. It is strictly smaller than the corresponding kmin,j−1, because the audit has stopped
for all other values. Further, because at most one winner ballot will be drawn in the jth round, the largest possible
number of winner ballots in the jth round is k + 1.
More formally, let the largest value of kj−1 for which s∗j−1(kj−1) 6= 0 be k, where s∗j is as defined in the proof of
Theorem 1. Then
k < kmin,j−1(MINERVA, (n1, n2, . . . , nj−1, . . .), p, α)
by the definition of kmin,j−1, Theorem 1. Further, the largest value of kj for which sj(kj) 6= 0 is k + 1.
We now show that if the jth round stops at all, it will be for kj = k + 1 and no other values of kj .
We observe that the only way to obtain k + 1 ballots in the jth round is if the existing number of winner ballots is k
and the new ballot drawn is for the winner. The probability is:
sj(k + 1) = psj−1(k)
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On the other hand, k ballots arise in the jth round if the existing number is k − 1 and a winner ballot is drawn, or the
existing number is k and the ballot drawn is not for the winner.
sj(k) = (1− p)sj−1(k) + psj−1(k − 1)
Similarly:
rj(k + 1) =
1
2
rj−1(k)
and
rj(k) =
1
2
rj−1(k) +
1
2
rj−1(k − 1)
If the condition is satisfied by values other than k + 1, because τ is monotone increasing, it is satisfied by k:
τj(k) =
sj(k + 1) + sj(k)
rj(k + 1) + rj(k)
=
sj−1(k) + psj−1(k − 1)
rj−1(k) + 12rj−1(k − 1)
≥ 1
α
Thus τj(k) is a weighted average of σ(k, p, j − 1) and p1
2
σ(k − 1, p, j − 1) and:
p
1
2
σ(k − 1, p, j − 1) = (1− p)1
2
σ(k, p, j − 1) < σ(k, p, j − 1) < τ(k, p, j − 1) < 1
α
as k < kmin,j−1(MINERVA, (1, 2, . . . , j − 1, . . .), p, α). And hence, τj(k) does not pass the stopping condition.
Thus, if AM and AB denote the B2 MINERVA and B2 BRAVO audits respectively,
AM (Xj) = Correct⇔ τj(k, p, j) ≥ 1
α
⇔ σ(k, p, j) ≥ 1
α
⇔ AB(Xj) = Correct
Samples that do satisfy the stopping condition have the same MINERVA and BRAVO p-values, which are otherwise not
the same.
Corollary 1. Given α, p, δ such that δ ≥ α, the B2 (α, p)-BRAVO audit stops for a sample of size nj with kj ballots
for the winner, if and only if the (α, δ,Ha, (1, 2, 3, . . . , j, . . .))-ATHENA audit stops.
Proof. As in Theorem 5, the jth audit round stops only for the largest possible number of winner votes if it does at
all. Thus, it stops if and only if it satisfies the (α, p)-BRAVO stopping condition. Additionally, the second stopping
condition for ATHENA is also a BRAVO condition, and is always satisfied when the first one is satisfied because
δ ≥ α.
A.5 Proof of efficiency property of MINERVA and ATHENA
Theorem 6. Given sample X of size nj with kj samples for the winner,
AB(X) = Correct⇒ AA(X) = Correct
where AB denotes the (α, p)-BRAVO test and AA the (α, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .))-MINERVA test or the
(α, δ, p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .))-ATHENA test for δ ≥ α.
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Proof. Note that for a fixed election and fixed round sizes, each of τ and ω, the complementary cdf stopping conditions
for MINERVA and ATHENA respectively, is a weighted sum of σ, the monotone increasing BRAVO stopping condition.
Further, if k is the number of winner ballots, the elements in the weighted sum are at least as large as σ. In fact,
equality for τ occurs only when k is the largest possible number of winner ballots in the round. Thus
σ(kj , p, nj) ≥ 1
α
⇒ τj(kj , p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .)), ωj(kj , p, (n1, n2, . . . , nj , . . .)) ≥ 1
α
Note that ATHENA has a second condition, which is also satisfied
σ(kj , p, nj) ≥ 1
α
⇒ σ(kj , p, nj) ≥ 1
δ
